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INTRODUCTION
On January 26, 2009, the nation‘s second set of live-born octuplets was
delivered at a California hospital.1 The public fascination with this unusual
event quickly turned ugly when the media revealed that the new mother was
thirty-three-year-old Nadya Suleman, a single, unemployed woman already
caring for six other children under the age of eight. As Ellen Goodman of
the Boston Globe described it, upon discovery of Suleman‘s identity, the
mood of the country went ―from ‗Gee whiz‘ to ‗Are you kidding?‘‖ in a
matter of days.2
The reaction to Nadya Suleman‘s new family stands in stark contrast to
the enthusiastic reception for many other families with high-order multiples. For example, the cable show Jon & Kate Plus 8, which features a
family with a set of sextuplets and a set of twins, is currently one of cable
television‘s highest-rated shows.3 The McCaughey septuplets, born in
1997, are similarly famous: for example, they celebrate their birthdays each
year with Dateline reporter Ann Curry.4 Indeed, public fascination with
high-birth families dates back at least to the famous Dionne quintuplets of
the 1930s, who were treated as a tourist attraction by the Canadian govern-
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1
Remarkably, the doctors were surprised by the arrival of octuplets; they had only been expecting
to deliver seven babies. CNN, Octuplets’ Births Surprise California Doctors, CNNHEALTH.COM, Jan.
27, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/01/26/california.octuplets/ (link).
2
Ellen Goodman, The Ethical Failures of Fertility Treatment, BOSTONGLOBE.COM, Feb. 6, 2009,
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2009/02/06/the_ethical_failures_of_
fertility_treatment/ (link).
3
See Susan Stewart, Big Brood Spawns Big Ratings, NYTIMES.COM, Feb. 12, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/15/arts/television/15stew.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=octuplets+stewart&s
t=nyt (link).
4
See, e.g., Ann Curry, Eight is Great for the McCaughey Septuplets, MSNBC.COM, Jan. 15, 2006,
http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/10867824/ (describing Curry‘s visit to the children for their eighth birthday) (link); Ann Curry, After Ten Years, New Adventures for Septuplets, Dec. 12, 2007,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22223331/ (link).
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ment and who were visited by more than three million people over a tenyear span.5
Compare the reactions to Nadya Suleman‘s story. The medical director of the Center for Human Reproduction termed the births a ―medical catastrophe.‖6 A columnist for the Los Angeles Times called her story
―grotesque‖ and ―bizarre,‖ and criticized her ―manifest irresponsibility.‖7 A
San Francisco writer deemed her ―misguided and clearly troubled.‖8 Even
her own parents vehemently criticized Suleman; her father called her ―‗absolutely irresponsible[]‘‖ and questioned her mental stability,9 while
Nadya‘s mother described her actions as ―‗unconscionable.‘‖10
The cultural backlash against Suleman has focused on three separate
but related issues. The first set of concerns revolves around Suleman herselfspecifically, her ability to parent fourteen young children. Disclosures about Suleman‘s background came fast and furious after the
children‘s birth: she is single, she is unemployed, she has been receiving
disability payments for several years, at least two of her older children receive Supplemental Security Income (SSI) payments and thus may have
some kind of special needs, and while undergoing her most recent fertility
treatment, she lived with her parents in a three-bedroom house that may be
going into foreclosure.11 Judgments about her race, explicitly acknowledged or not, may also be a factor.12 Her defenders see these criticisms
against Suleman as a form of ―mother-blaming.‖13
A second set of concerns revolves around the medical procedures that
led to the octuplets‘ birth. The fertility clinic that treated Suleman agreed to
implant her with at least six embryos during an in vitro fertilization (IVF)
5

See The Dionne Quintuplets: A Depression-Era Freak Show, CNN.COM, Nov. 19, 1997,
http://www.cnn.com/US/9711/19/dionne.quints/ (describing how the Canadian government removed the
girls from their parents and housed them at ―Quintland,‖ earning the government and nearby businesses
around a half-billion dollars in profits) (link).
6
Posting of Judith Graham to Triage, Doctors on the Octuplets: It’s Medical Negligence, Feb. 5,
2009,
http://newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/triage/2009/02/doctors-on-the-octuplets-a-medicalcatastrophe.html (reporting comments of Dr. Norbert Gleicher) (link).
7
Tim Rutten, The Excesses of Nadya Suleman, LATIMES.COM, Feb. 11, 2009,
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-rutten11-2009feb11,0,1768472.column (link).
8
Debra J. Saunders, Dysfunctional Familymaking, SFGATE.COM, Feb. 8, 2009,
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/02/08/INRC15MOCA.DTL (link).
9
See Octuplet Grandfather to Oprah: I Question Her Mental Situation, THE HUFFINGTON POST,
Feb. 20, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/02/19/octuplet-grandfather-to-o_n_168448.html
(link).
10
See Octuplets’ Grandmother Criticizes Daughter, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 9, 2009, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29098465/ (link).
11
See, e.g., Rutten, supra note 7; Octuplet Grandfather to Oprah: I Question Her Mental Situation,
supra note 9.
12
See Bridget J. Crawford & Lolita Buckner Innis, Multiple Anxieties: Breaching Race, Class, and
Gender Norms with Assisted Reproduction (Cleveland-Marshall Legal Studies Paper, No. 1360453,
Mar. 19, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1360453 (link).
13
See, e.g., id.

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/22/
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procedure. The leading fertility industry group asserts that this decision
was contrary to its recommended guidelines that women under the age of
thirty-five have no more than two embryos implanted during any single IVF
attempt.14
A final set of issues concerns more fundamental questions about
screening parents. Many wonder how a clinic could agree to provide a single mother of six with a fertility treatment that mightand diddouble her
number of children. This particular debate echoes larger cultural concerns
over the changing American family, including calls for two parents (one of
each sex) for every child.
In response to these concerns, commentators and legislators are calling
for new, more restrictive regulation of the fertility industry. Shortly after
the octuplets were born, Georgia Right to Life helped get legislation introduced that would limit the number of eggs that could be fertilized in any
IVF cycle to no more than the number that would be transferred into the
woman.15 In Missouri, legislation was introduced to impose limits on the
number of embryos that could be implanted.16
Although the debate about whether and how to regulate the fertility industry is certainly not new,17 Suleman‘s story has thrown two kinds of proposals into particularly sharp relief. The first set of proposals seeks to
increase regulation of assisted reproductive technologies (―ART‖) via the
doctors that perform them. For example, some commentators urge the
United States to adopt mandatory limits on the number of embryos that can
be implanted, as other countries have done.18 Although the American Society of Reproductive Medicine has issued guidelines regarding the appropriate number of embryos to transfer, adherence is entirely voluntary and,
quite obviously, not universal. The issues entwined with such restrictions
are difficult and important, and the Suleman case has begun a conversation
14

See Am. Soc‘y Reprod. Med., Guidelines on Numbers of Embryos Transferred, 90 FERTILITY &
STERILITY S163, S163 (2008) (link).
15
See Ethical Treatment of Human Embryos Act, S.B. 169, 150th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ga.
2009) (link).
16
See H.B. 810, 95th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009) (requiring compliance with the
American Society of Reproductive Medicine‘s recommendations on implantation) (link). Placing limits
on assisted reproductive technology (―ART‖) procedures can be part of a ―right to life‖ agenda because
of beliefs that embryos are persons and that ART is morally wrong. Accordingly, arguments for regulating ART risk alignment with an anti-abortion agenda, and must be crafted carefully. See, e.g., William
Saletan, Crocktuplets: Hijacking the Octuplets Backlash to Restrict IVF, SLATE, Mar. 4, 2009,
http://www.slate.com/id/2212876/pagenum/all/ (arguing that the chief purpose of the Georgia bill is not
to ―help women‖ but ―to establish legal rights for embryos‖) (link).
17
See NAOMI R. CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES: WHY THE FERTILITY MARKET NEEDS LEGAL
REGULATION (2009); DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS
DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION (2006).
18
See, e.g., Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology and Reproductive
Equality, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457, 1458–59 (2008) (describing German and Italian regulatory
schemes) (link).
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about more meaningful regulation of the medical procedures used by the
fertility industry. Indeed, as we develop further below, we support several
such initiatives.19
We are far more troubled, however, by a second set of proposals arising out of the Suleman backlash: those that urge placing restrictions on
which individuals may receive fertility treatment. Margaret Somerville,
founder of the McGill Centre for Medicine, Ethics, and Law, argues that we
should regulate access to reproductive technology in the same way that we
regulate access to adoption.20 In her opinion, if a ―single woman with six
children‖ and ―living with her parents‖ would not be permitted to adopt a
child, then she should not be permitted to receive fertility treatments such as
IVF either.21 Under this theory, women with a certain number of children,
or with limited financial resources, should be precluded from receiving fertility treatment. Somerville also suggests that a patient‘s age, and perhaps
her marital status, should be relevant considerations. Some ART providers
have already tried to impose access limitations on the basis of sexual orientation.22 Indeed, many ART clinicians say they would choose to reject patients based on their marital status or sexual orientation,23 and some states
have laws that permit the use of reproductive technology only by married
couples.24
Issues related to access are also weighty and difficult, but our conclusion here differs from our position about regulating the medical procedures
themselves: neither fertility clinics nor the state should be in the business of
restricting access to reproductive technology. We do not require financial
litmus tests or impose limits on family size for individuals who are able to
conceive without reproductive technology, and we do not believe that requiring some medical assistance in order to conceive means that infertile
individuals should have to tolerate such restrictions.
Perhaps the most difficult question raised by the Suleman case and
other high-order births is whether government regulation can be justified at
19
We save for another piece, however, detailed answers to many questions in this area, such as issues relating to how to regulate sperm, egg, and embryo donors, including both anonymous donors and
those known to the recipient, and what to do about insurance.
20
See Margaret Somerville, Examining Society’s Role, OTTAWACITIZEN.COM, Feb. 11, 2009,
http://www.ottawacitizen.com/opinion/Examining+society+role/1275699/story.html (link).
21
Id. Somerville is also troubled by the case of a sixty-year-old Canadian woman who gave birth to
twin boys after traveling to India to receive IVF treatment using donor eggs and her husband‘s sperm.
Id.
22
See, e.g., N. Coast Women‘s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego County Superior Court, 189
P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008) (ruling that a California clinic could not rely on religious objections and refuse to
perform an intrauterine insemination procedure on a lesbian patient) (link).
23
See Andrea D. Gurmankin et al., Screening Practices and Beliefs of Assisted Reproductive Technology Programs, 83 FERTILITY & STERILITY 61, 66 (2005); Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive
Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 54 (2008).
24
Oklahoma, for example, limits the use of artificial insemination to a husband and a wife. See
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 553 (West 2007).
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all in the context of ART. Before evaluating each set of proposals in further detail, we turn first to this threshold issue.
I. SHOULD WE REGULATE?
There is a powerful case to be made that the law should abstain from
regulating ART entirely. ART involves extraordinarily personal social and
medical choices, and raises critical issues related to patient autonomy and
freedom of reproductive choice. Moreover, the cultural stigma traditionally
associated with infertility may argue for less public attention to these issues.
Nevertheless, we believe that some limited regulation is justifiable.
A. Patient Autonomy
We begin with the question of patient autonomy, the idea that individuals ordinarily have the right to determine for themselves the most appropriate course of medical treatment. Doctors may not, for example, treat a
patient without her consent, and patients have a right to be informed of the
relevant risks and benefits of any medical procedure before undergoing it.25
But there have always been limitations to this core principle of autonomy.
Patients do not have a right to receive medical procedures or medications
that the Food and Drug Administration has deemed unsafe,26 and they do
not have the right to compel others to undertake risks, such as submitting to
bone marrow transplants, in order to further their own health agendas. Indeed, federal and state governments often cite the need to regulate risk in
justifying limitations on individual autonomy. Better-known examples of
such limitations include mandatory vaccinations, speed limits, and seatbelt
and helmet laws. Autonomy has thus always been modified by risk, and we
believe it is that principle that is relevant in the ART context.
When a patient undergoes an ART procedure that results in high-order
multiples, two sets of health risks are created: one to the mother and one to
the children. Mothers carrying high-order multiples face increased risks of
pregnancy complications and even death.27 Children who are part of a multiple birth are far more likely to be born premature and at a low birth
weight. Prematurity and low birth weight are associated with higher risks
of infant death and a host of other impairments, including ―cerebral palsy[,]
vision and hearing problems[,] and long-term motor, cognitive, behavioral,

25
See Marsha Garrison, Regulating Reproduction, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1623, 1631–32 (2008)
(describing the implications of the principle of patient autonomy) (link).
26
Id. at 1632 (explaining that the FDA has ―the authority to deny access to drugs and medical devices found to be unsafe or ineffective‖).
27
Id. at 1644 (―Some experts estimate that maternal morbidity is seven times greater in multiple
pregnancies than in singleton deliveries and that perinatal mortality rates are four times higher for twins
and six times higher for triplets and higher-order births.‖). Men who intend to become fathers through
ART do not face comparable medical risks.
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social-emotional, health, and growth problems.‖28 Choices about the appropriate number of embryos to implant are therefore neither necessarily benign nor neutral—they carry the very real potential for adverse
consequences. Importantly, these adverse consequences are not limited to
the patient herself; rather, the ART patient‘s choices also create risk for
third parties: the children who might be born as a result of the pregnancy attempt.29 It is this potential risk to third parties, against which any potential
children are obviously unable to defend, that seems to outweigh concerns
for patient autonomy and to justify at least minimal government intervention. In addition to patient autonomy, however, are other values that compete against the health risks to mother and children.
B. Reproductive Choice
The principle of freedom in matters of reproductive choice is also of
paramount concern in discussing restrictions on ART procedures, and we
do not believe that anything we say here should serve as a basis for retreating from that principle. In this context, however, we believe that the sort of
regulations we endorse below do not impinge upon the core values undergirding reproductive freedom. At its essence, protecting women‘s reproductive freedom means that women must retain the right to decide whether
or not they want to reproduce, and we must therefore analyze any new proposed regulations to be sure they do not infringe upon this essential right.30
Regulating the number of embryos that may be transferred during IVF
procedures does not, of course, compel a woman to reproduce against her
will, so that concern is not implicated by placing restrictions on ART. But
embryo transfer restrictions may indeed reduce the likelihood that a woman
will be able to successfully reproduce. This is an important and powerful
counter-argument to ART regulation: if transferring more embryos increases the chance of a successful pregnancy, then perhaps government regulation should not stand in the way. Just as personal autonomy is modulated
by risk, however, reproductive freedom is modulated by concerns for the
rights and freedom of others. We do not allow individuals to become parents at any cost; an individual may quite obviously not appropriate another
person‘s child in order to become a parent, nor force another woman to
28

Id.
Public costs range from health care to education. There is a generally-recognized social obligation to protect children once they come into existence. Of course, the meaning of ―come into existence‖
is highly contested: Louisiana, for example, has adopted legislation recognizing that embryos are ―persons,‖ and the proposed legislation in Georgia accords similar status to embryos. See LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:129 (2008) (―A viable in vitro fertilized human ovum is a juridical person . . . .‖) (link); Saletan, supra note 16. In arguing for the protection of future children, we are not according personhood to
embryos; indeed, if all embryos created in an ART procedure are not transferred, embryos may need to
be donated to another infertile patient, used for medical research, stored indefinitely, or destroyed.
30
See generally John A. Robertson, Assisting Reproduction, Choosing Genes, and the Scope of Reproductive Freedom, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1490, 1492 (2008) (arguing that ―society is accustomed to
think of reproductive autonomy in constitutional terms as primarily a right not to reproduce‖) (link).
29
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serve as a surrogate mother. Society has always been willing to draw some
line that it will not cross in furthering any particular individual‘s quest to
become a parent.
In determining where to draw that line, society should strive to protect
an individual‘s interest in becoming a parent, while simultaneously protecting society‘s interests in healthy children through appropriate market regulation—regulation that will guard, for example, against power and
informational imbalances. Discussions about the number of embryos to be
transferred during IVF, the amount of ART-related recordkeeping, informed
consent requirements, and measures for keeping the market safe may potentially move the United States toward this goal. There has historically been
comparatively little oversight of the fertility industry, so these discussions
are long overdue. Understanding the reasons the government has thus far
abstained from regulation, however, will help frame future decisions.
II. EXISTING REGULATIONS AND NEW PROPOSALS REGARDING
MEDICAL PROCEDURES
We turn now to a brief discussion of existing laws regulating assisted
reproduction. We then consider whether new regulation of the medical procedures themselves might be appropriate, before turning in the next section
to questions regarding regulation of access to ART technology.
A. The Current Lay of the Law
Currently, regulation over reproductive technology by the state and
federal government is limited. The fertility industry mostly self regulates
through nonbinding guidelines and suggested ethical practices, though there
are various physician licensing requirements.31 There are numerous possible reasons for this comparative lack of oversight, including the tendency
for scientific advances to outpace the law, the limited use of reproductive
technology until the 1980s, and the secrecy and stigma surrounding infertility. Moreover, reproductive technology taps into deeply conflicting cultural perspectives on parenthood outside of the nuclear, biological family
and other controversial social issues,32 such as stem cell research, abortion,
and even sex itself.
Nevertheless, over the past several decades, the federal government has
taken some steps toward regulationtoday, it oversees clinical laboratory
services, drugs, and medical devices used in IVF treatments; has standards
that establish safe use of human tissue, such as donor sperm and eggs; and
31
For further discussion, see CAHN, supra note 17; Naomi Cahn, Accidental Incest: Drawing the
Line—or the Curtain?—for Reproductive Technology, 32 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 59 (2009) (link).
32
See generally Gaia Bernstein, The Socio-Legal Acceptance of New Technologies: A Close Look at
Artificial Insemination, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1035 (2002) (discussing reasons for the lack of oversight); on
cultural conflict, see NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES (forthcoming
2010).
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provides monitoring of fertility clinic success rates to protect ART consumers from fraudulent advertisements.33 Federal law does not otherwise regulate the medical procedures involved in donation.
The ART industry has also engaged in some self-regulation,34 developing a series of ethical guidelines that contain advice and standards on topics
that go beyond basic ART medical practice to include such complex issues
as patient screening.35 Although most reproductive endocrinologists follow
these standards, they are not, as the Suleman case so nicely illustrates, binding. The occasional ART ―mix-ups‖ that make their way into newspapers
or courts remind consumers and the public at large of the general lack of
oversight.36 By contrast, many European countries take a far more restrictive approach, with laws primarily designed to protect embryos37 as does
the new proposed Georgia law. Our proposed regulations are justified instead by concerns for the infertile patient and her future children, and for
the ethical fertility doctor who does not want to transfer six embryos.38 The
Suleman case highlights some of the most pressing areas where regulation
is needed, such as the number of embryos transferred, the need for standardized informed consent, and the role of insurance. The case also, somewhat
paradoxically, shows one area where we should not regulate: access to ART
procedures.39 This Essay focuses on the embryo limit and access issues,
two of the most criticized aspects of the Suleman case.

33

See The Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. § 263a-1 to -7
(2006) (link); 21 C.F.R. § 1271.1 (2008) (link).
34
See SPAR, supra note 17, at 34 (observing that ―the threat of regulation hangs heavily over the industry, prodding suppliers to conform to a fairly rigorous regime of self-regulation and often to act as if
they were anticipating a regulatory response‖).
35
See Am. Soc‘y Reprod. Med., Ethical Considerations of Assisted Reproductive Technologies:
ASRM
Ethics
Committee
Reports
and
Statements,
available
at
http://www.asrm.org/Media/Ethics/ethicsmain.html (link). On screening, see Ethics Comm. of Am.
Soc‘y Reprod. Med., Child-rearing Ability and the Provision of Fertility Services, 82 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 564 (2004).
36
There have been several reported cases of embryos that were wrongly implanted in the wrong
woman. See Leslie Bender, “To Err Is Human”: ART Mix-ups: A Labor-Based, Relational Proposal, 9
J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 443, 446–453 (2006).
37
See Rao, supra note 18, at 1458–59. Indeed, the very title of the German law makes its intent
plain: it is named the ―Embryo Protection Act.‖ See id. at 1458.
38
A doctor might agree to implant more embryos than recommended because of the competition
between the more than 400 fertility clinics in this country. Stephanie Saul, Birth of Octuplets Puts Focus
on
Fertility
Clinics,
NYTIMES.COM,
Feb.
11,
2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/12/health/12ivf.html?ref=health (link).
39
Ms. Suleman appears to have used a known donor to create her embryos. There are complex issues involved in regulating the donor world to assure protection of all involved. See, e.g., Cahn, Accidental Incest, supra note 31; Naomi Cahn, Necessary Subjects: The Need for a Mandatory National
Donor Gamete Databank, 12 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 203 (2009).
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B. New Ways to Regulate
We support limits on the number of embryos transferred in any single
ART procedure, although we would not impose limits on the number of
embryos created in any cycle. The risks posed to both patients and future
children are too great, and the countervailing pressure for both doctors and
patients to achieve a pregnancy too strong, to remain unaddressed. The
American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) guidelines, developed by fertility practitioners, articulate the parameters of workable guidelines, and build in some flexibility to ensure that they are appropriately
sensitive to the situation of each patient. For example, consider the current
ASRM guideline that no more than two embryos should be transferred into
a patient under the age of 35 ―in the absence of extraordinary circumstances.‖40 A regulation that mirrors this directive leaves room for exemptions—a thirty-four-year-old woman might be able to establish, for
example, that due to a repeated history of unsuccessful attempts or poor
embryo quality, she should be allowed to transfer three embryos on her last
ART attempt.
The need to reconcile generally binding guidelines with the potential
for flexibility suggests that some sort of administrative agency may ultimately be the best mechanism for ART regulation. One possibility is to
create an entity modeled on the British Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, a board-directed governmental organization whose members
include representatives from various stakeholding constituencies.41 A
second is Professor Marsha Garrison‘s suggestion that we look toward a
―quasi-public regulatory system,‖ like that in place in the organ transplant
context.42 This quasi-public system could be responsible for reviewing appeals from patients who believe they warrant exceptions from the guidelines. Each of these alternatives involves creating a federal agency, which
ensures that any new ART guidelines are national rather than state-based.
This is critical, given the ease with which patients could travel between jurisdictions to circumvent unwelcome state restrictions. Such an agency

40
41

See Am. Soc‘y Reprod. Med., supra note 14, at S163.
See FAQs about the HFEA, http://www.hfea.gov.uk/127.html#6 (last visited Apr. 28, 2009)

(link).
42
Garrison, supra note 25, at 1648. A national transplant network was established in 1984 ―to be
run by a private, nonprofit entity, that would maintain regional organ banks and set criteria for donation
and receipt of organs.‖ Id. at 1648–49. According to Garrison:
Since 1986, the nongovernmental United Network for Organ Sharing (―UNOS‖)
has contracted with the federal Department of Health and Human Services
(―HHS‖) to run this network. The UNOS Board of Directors, composed largely
of transplant surgeons, establishes organ transplant policies, but these policies are
not implemented until approved by the HHS Secretary. Id.
Even Garrison acknowledges that the UNOS approach is not perfect, but it seems to be a possible alternative regulatory scheme.
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could also implement enforcement mechanisms targeted at fertility clinics
by imposing fines and handling de-accreditation proceedings.
There are powerful objections to mandatory regulation. As stated
above, the higher risks for both mothers and children associated with multiple births provide the primary justification for exploring a new regulatory
approach to ART, but it does not necessarily follow that federal government
regulation is the best approach. Perhaps we should instead respect the traditional sanctity of the doctor-patient relationship and rely upon physicians to
self-regulate, or allow states to experiment with different types of regulation
before establishing federal standards. After all, we currently have a healthy
tort system to bring medical malpractice claims, and, in addition to the industry‘s own organizations, there are state medical boards that could potentially sanction their members (indeed, the California medical board is
investigating Suleman‘s physician).
Ultimately, however, we cannot rely on doctors who perform ART to
self-regulate. How can a doctor, who has treated a patient through repeatedly unsuccessful pregnancy attempts, be expected to resist a desperate plea
to implant just one more embryo?43 Further, interference in the doctorpatient relationship is hardly unprecedented. Even if patients plead for
them, doctors cannot legally prescribe medications that are not FDAapproved; nor can doctors enroll patients in medical studies without complying with informed consent guidelines. It is clear, moreover, that voluntary guidelines have not workedstatistics from 2006, the most recent
available, show that almost 4% of ART pregnancies involved three fetuses
or more.44 In sum, when procedures are deemed sufficiently risky, government regulation has traditionally intervened in the doctor-patient relationship, and we believe the risks here are sufficiently great to allow that
imposition.
III. PROPOSALS REGARDING ACCESS
Opening the door to any regulation potentially brings its own set of
problems, including increasing financial pressures, inducing patients to travel, and, critically, inducing states to impose regulations on access to ART.
We now turn to these issues.

43
Estimates based on government reports are that less than 20% of fertility clinics comply with the
voluntary guidelines restricting the number of embryos to be transferred into women under the age of
35. Stephanie Nano, Few Fertility Clinics Follow Embryo Guidelines, SFGATE.COM, Feb. 21, 2009,
http://www.sfchronicle.us/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/02/21/MN2A161S2S.DTL (link). The guidelines do allow for some flexibility, so this may overstate the lack of compliance. Doctors also face competitive pressures to report high success rates.
44
See U.S. DEP‘T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2006 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
SUCCESS RATES 22 (2008), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ART2006/508PDF/2006ART.pdf
(link). Interestingly, only 1.9% of births involved triplets or higher orders of multiples, perhaps due to
selective reduction. Id.
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A. Financial Considerations
Although we advocate more regulation, we recognize the critical role
of compassion for patients experiencing infertility. Infertility is one of the
most difficult life challenges an individual can encounter,45 and we believe
we must do more to facilitate access to treatment. Any new ART regulations must therefore be coupled with increased insurance coverage. Indeed,
one of the reasons that individuals are willing to risk their own health and
that of their future children by transferring a large number of embryos is
because each individual IVF procedure is so expensive that a patient may
only be able to afford one or at most two attempts. If patients knew that insurance would cover multiple IVF attempts, the temptation to gamble on
any single procedure would be greatly reduced.
June Carbone and Paige Gottheim suggest another potential problem
with regulation: imposing limits on embryo transfers might cause us to
―lose[] control of the activity altogether‖ by driving women underground to
black market fertility clinics or overseas to doctors who will comply with
their treatment preferences.46 These are legitimate concerns, but our proposal to increase insurance coverage will allay many of them. Most women
are not seeking to transfer five embryos because they want quintuplets; they
are transferring five embryos because they want a successful pregnancy. If
women knew that multiple attempts with one or two embryos would be
covered by insurance, they would feel less pressed to travel overseas or to
engage in illegal fertility treatments.47
B. Restrictions on Access
Another powerful objection to regulation is the concern that opening
the door to any kind of government interference in fertility treatments will
also open the door to restrictions on ART access, issues that are surfacing in
the wake of the Suleman case.48 We do not believe that any new government regulations should include rules that restrict access to fertility treatment by discriminating among potential patients. Clinics should not screen
on the basis of preexisting family size, the financial resources available to
care for any children born as a result of ART, or the marital status or sexual
45

E.g., David Orentlicher, Discrimination Out of Dismissiveness: The Example of Infertility 12
(Apr. 29, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy).
46
See June Carbone & Paige Gottheim, Markets, Subsidies, Regulation, and Trust: Building Ethical
Understandings into the Market for Fertility Services, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 509, 518 (2006).
47
See id. at 534 (using Great Britain as an example).
48
See generally Martha M. Ertman, What’s Wrong With a Parenthood Market? A New and Improved Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1, 15 (2003) (―The free market aspects of alternative insemination transactions play a crucial role in making this branch of the parenthood market
particularly beneficial to marginalized groups.‖). Ertman writes: ―I think the private law nature of alternative inseminations, on balance, furthers human flourishing because statutory regulations would likely
reflect majoritarian bias against single parents and gay people.‖ Id. at 22.
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orientation of potential patients.49 Individuals able to conceive without reproductive technology are not subject to such restrictions before they expand their families. Indeed, we are confident that any general attempt to
impose limits on family size, such as China‘s one-child policy, would be
greeted with horror by the American public. For patients who are single or
in a same-sex relationship, the state should not be in the position of barring
access to parenthood. There is simply no rational basis for doing so.50 Virtually all states, for example, permit gay and lesbian parents to serve as foster parents and to adopt; allowing access to reproductive technology is
entirely comparable.
Commentators might respond that ART is more like adoption than natural childbirth, and that while restrictions on family size have no place in
the nation‘s bedrooms, they do have a place in the nation‘s medical labs and
fertility clinics.51 Margaret Somerville, for example, argues that adoption is
the better comparison for ART because ―in both cases the resulting families
are deliberately constructed with state assistance, rather than simply occurring naturally.‖52 Similarly, Professor Garrison argues that the laws on
adoption are an ―obvious source of policy guidance‖ for ART regulation.53
These assumptions are questionable. First, most families wrestling in
silence with the challenge of infertility, paying for treatment out-of-pocket
and unaided by insurance coverage, would surely question the view that
their family‘s construction is a state struggle rather than a purely private
one. To the extent that the state provides ―assistance,‖ it provides similar
help to any family involved with health care. Families that conceive ―naturally‖ benefit from ―state assistance‖ to research and medical facilities.
―Natural parents‖ give birth in state-run hospitals and enjoy the fruits of
government research on matters of prenatal and early childhood care no less
than successful ART patients.
More fundamentally, we think families created via ART are not, contrary to Professor Garrison‘s argument, truly analogous to families formed
49

Restrictions based on financial resources or preexisting family size have recently received the
most attention, but we have also seen calls for restrictions based on age, marital status, and sexual orientation. See, e.g., Somerville, supra note 21.
50
Cf. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (invalidating a law prohibiting same-sex marriage on state constitutional grounds) (link); Kerrigan v. Comm‘r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn.
2008) (same) (link); Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding that a
law banning same-sex marriage lacked a rational basis) (link). But cf. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d
1 (N.Y. 2006) (upholding a law banning same-sex marriage as having a rational basis) (link).
51
See Somerville, supra note 21.
52
Id.
53
Garrison, supra note 25, at 1629; see also Richard F. Storrow, The Bioethics of Prospective Parenthood: In Pursuit of the Proper Standard for Gatekeeping in Infertility Clinics, 28 CARDOZO L. REV.
2283, 2294–95, 2314 (2007) (suggesting that regulation of reproductive technology might fall between
adoption and non-assisted reproduction, and that clinics might use a preliminary screen for fitness, not a
more complete best-interest test) (link). We are more wary than Professor Storrow about ―fitness‖ determinations given the dangers (that he recognizes) of the relationship between fitness and eugenics.
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by adoption. Instead, the better comparison is to families created without
physician intervention. Unlike ART, adoption is fundamentally concerned
with actual children, not medical decisions.54 First, adoption inherently requires legal determinations that are solely within the power of the state—to
grant an adoption, the state must terminate, and then reassign, parental
rights. Second, adoptions increasingly involve the wishes of biological
mothers. Consider the significant involvement teenaged Juno had with the
would-be adoptive parents of her baby in the 2007 eponymous movie, for
example.55 Even when donors are involved in reproductive technology, that
level of interaction between the parties is literally unheard-of. Third, adoption regulations necessarily focus on the best interests of a living child,56
and it is appropriate to consider the best alternatives for that particular
child. In the ART context, we are obviously talking about potential children. Restricting a patient‘s access, by definition, means that the future
children in question will never be born.
The possibility of regulation potentially raises complex morality-based
issues concerning the scope of government control over families. We believe the government should focus on regulating medical procedures, not
family formation.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, we need to adopt regulations that support the fertility industry while also protecting the interests of patients, children, and the public. Artificial reproductive technology has provided enormous comfort to
people who want children. That does not mean, however, that we should
not prevent doctors and their patients from creating instant families of
eight-plus. The risks to patients and their future children are simply too
great to allow us to continue to rely upon purely voluntary guidelines that
have been demonstrably unsuccessful. At the same time, neither the state
nor individual fertility clinics should be in the business of deciding which
individuals are sufficiently ―fit‖ to receive fertility treatments. Narrowly
tailored regulation must be designed both to prevent abusive uses of ART
procedures that endanger women and future children, and to ensure that patients themselves make the central decision of whether to become parents.
Indeed, regulations are essential for the future of a vibrant and successful
fertility industry and vibrant and healthy families.
54
See Sarah B. Lawsky & Naomi Cahn, Embryo Exchanges and Adoption Tax Credits (George
Washington Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 468, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1394046 (link).
55
JUNO (Fox Searchlight 2007).
56
We also object to regulations attempting to preclude single, gay, or lesbian individuals and
couples from adopting. For a map of existing laws, see National Gay & Lesbian Taskforce, Adoption
Laws in the U.S. (2008), available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/reports_and_research/adoption_laws
(link).
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